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PRODUCTS LIABILITY IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS-TOWARD
A THEORY OF ENTERPRISE LIABILITY UNDER "FORESEEABLE
AND INSURABLE LAWS": I1*
ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIGt
IN my earlier Article, "Guest Statutes in the Conflict of Laws,"' I at-
tempted to show that the "place of wrong" rule offered by the Restatement
of Conflicts for all types of torts, having been developed to protect the de-
fendant against "punishment" under a law other than that of the place of his
conduct,2 is quite inappropriate as a device for solving choice of law problems
involving what I have called enterprise liabilities for negligence without fault,
and that one of these liabilities, the motorist's liability to his guest, should be
subject to the "reasonably foreseeable and insurable" law. The present Article
will examine the applicability of this principle in the growing field of products
liability.
The development of the liability of manufacturers and other suppliers has
often been described as the very model of the growth of a common-law in-
stitution.3 Notwithstanding the many and often painful stages of this develop-
ment, the final result has been surprisingly uniform throughout the United
States, and indeed in common-law jurisdictions generally. But there have re-
mained a few important differences among the several jurisdictions, particu-
larly with regard to the structure and scope of the strict liabilities for breach
of warranty 4 and the negligence liabilities under the so-called MacPherson
rule,5 both generally 6 and in cases involving food and drink.7 In view of the
great practical importance and interstate impact of these problems, one might
expect a considerable body of conflicts law. But not-vithstanding much gratu-
itous judicial language, there is almost no such law, and the problem will be
one of novel impression in most jurisdictions. Thus, no other topic in the con-
flicts law of torts lends itself more readily to the formulation of a rational
*The second of three Articles by the author. The first appears in the present volume
at page 595. The third will appear in the May issue.
tWalter Perry Johnson Professor of Law, University of California (Berkeley).
1. 69 YALE L.J. 595 (1960).
2. See American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909).
3. See, e.g., Lav, AN INTRODUcON TO LEGAL REASONING (1949). For a compara-
tive study, see Comment, Retailer and Manufacturer Liability it Germany and the United
States for Personal Injury From Defective Products, 1959 Duxn L.J. 94.
4. See PRossER, ToRTs 493-96 (2d ed. 1955) ; Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel
(Article to be published in the Yale Law Journal for June 1960).
5. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111. N.E. 1050 (1916) ; see PRos-
SER, TORTS 499-501 (2d ed. 1955).
6. Id. at 502-06, 510-11.
7. Id. at 507-10.
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solution, unburdened by concepts and rules drawn from the dogmatic inter-
lude in American legal history which produced the Rcstatemcnt of the Law of the
Conflict of Laws, a document which, as to other topics, has so seriously dis-
turbed the law in this field.8
Products liability is hardly older than that dogmatic interlude. No wonder
then that, in the field of products liability 0 perhaps even more than elsewhere,
some courts LO have endeavored to give at least the semblance of reality to the
Restaters' grand but lifeless design-by invoking their conflicts rules even in
those cases in which there was no conflict." Such cases, which represent al-
8. See, e.g., Ehrenzweig, Contracts in the Conflict of Laws-Part One: Validity, 59
CoLum. L. REv. 973 (1959); Ehrenzweig, The Statute of Frauds in the Conflict of Laws:
The Basic Rule of Validation, 59 CoLUM. L. Rmv. 874 (1959) ; Ehrenzweig, The Place of
Acting in Intentional Multistate Torts: Law and Reason Versus the Restatement, 36
MINN. L. REv. 1 (1951). See generally EHRE-VzwEIG, CoNxFicr OF L.aws 6-13 (1959).
9. For purposes of this analysis, breach of warranty is treated as a tort, as it is fur
other purposes in most jurisdictions. See PRossF-, ToRTs 493-94 (2d ed. 1955). See also
DicKERsoN, PRoDucrs L naBmrr AND TE FOOD CoNsumsiR (1951); Prosser, The Im-
plied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MrqN. L REV. 117 (1943); Patterson,
Manufacturer's Statutory Warranty: Tort or Contract?, 10 .MEcER L Ray. 272 (1959) ;
Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Article to be published in the Yale Law Jour-
nal for June 1960).
10. Pennsylvania, the home of the American Law Institute, author of the Restate-
ment, has with particular frequency invoked conflicts rules unnecessary to the decision.
See Carpini v. Pittsburgh & Weirton Bus Co., 216 F.2d 404 (3d Cir. 1954) (Pennsyl-
vania brakes causing West Virginia bus accident) (Goodrich, J.) ; Tomao v. A. P. De
Sanno & Son, 209 F2d 544 (3d Cir. 1954); Renuzit Home Prods. Co. v. General Mills,
Inc., 207 F.2d 955 (3d Cir. 1953); cf. Ryan v. Adam Scheidt Brewing Co., 197 F2d 614
(3d Cir. 1952); Kieffer v. Blue Seal Chem. Co., 196 F.2d 614, 615 (3d Cir. 1952) (Min-
nesota explosion of New Jersey product) (Goodrich, J.) ; Diesbourg v. Hazel-Atlas Glass
Co., 176 F.2d 410 (3d Cir. 1949) (Florida resident injured by Ohio bottle, filled in New
Jersey--MacPherson rule) (Goodrich, J.); Mannsz v. Macwhyte Co., 155 F.2d 445 (3d
Cir. 1946); Smith v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 18 F.R.D. 169 (M.D. Pa. 1955) (Alabama
widow recovers from Pennsylvania manufacturer for death of husband killed in Georgia
accident under Georgia law identical with lex fori); Foley v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines
Co., 363 Pa. 1, 9-10, 29-33, 68 A.2d 517, 521-22, 530-32 (1949) (MacPherson applicable
in both Ohio and Pennsylvania).
This practice is particularly objectionable when the court, lacking information on the
lex loci, purports to find the lex loci in accord with the general law of torts in effect at
the forum. See Trowbridge v. Abrasive Co., 190 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1951) (presumed
Oregon law), which, for its presumption of Oregon law, relied upon a "holding" in Moran
v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 166 F.2d 903, 916 (3d Cir. 1948) (presumed Ohio
law).
For a similar regrettable practice in contracts cases, see Ehrenmweig, Contracts in the
Conflict of Laws-Part One: Validity, 59 CoLum. L. REv. 973, 936 n.99 (1959). For
persuasive criticism, see Milner, Restatement: The Failure of a Legal Experiment, 20
U. Pin. L. Rnv. 795, 799 (1959), with statistical analysis.
11. Alexander v. Nash-Kelvinator Corp., 261 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1958) (.MlacPhersdm
in Pennsylvania and New York) ; Wright v. Carter Prods. Inc., 244 F.2d 53, 57, 59 (2d
Cir. 1957) (Massachusetts and New York--MacPherson); Pierce v. Ford M1otor Co.,
190 F.2d 910 (4th Cir. 1951) (MacPherson in Delaware and Virginia); Anderson v.
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most all available case "law," may be disregarded in this study.1 2 In all of
them the courts have in effect, and should have expressly, applied the lex fori
in the absence of any other lawv "properly" claimed to be different and applica-
ble.13
Linton, 178 F.2d 304, 309 (7th Cir. 1949) (holding for plaintiff under presumed "modern"
Iowa rule in the absence of an unambiguous rule to the contrary in either Iowa or the
forum) ; Reed & Barton Corp. v. Maas, 73 F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1934) (Massachusetts
manufacturer of coffee urn held liable under Wisconsin law of plaintiff's residence, iden-
tical with federal pre-Erie lex fori) ; State v. Garzell Plastics Indus., 152 F. Supp. 483
(E.D. Mich. 1957) (Maryland drowning owing to defect in Michigan boat-AMacPher-
son); Burkett v. Globe Indem. Co., 182 Miss. 423, 181 So. 316 (1938). In Gaston v.
Wabash R.R., 322 S.W.2d 865 (Mo. 1959); Haberly v. Reardon Co., 319 S.W.2d 859
(Mo. 1959); Atwell v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 152 A.2d 196 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1959),
the lex fori was probably the same as the lex loci, although the former was not men-
tioned. On Missouri law, see 24 Mo. L. REV. 554 (1959).
Occasionally, the two laws might have reached a decision for the plaintiff in different
ways. See, e.g., Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc. v. Barker, 228 F.2d 842 (1st Cir. 1955). cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 988 (1956), where a possibly less stringent liability rule under the law
of Nebraska, the place of harm, was neutralized by a lex fori favoring plaintiff concern-
ing the burden of proof. See also 228 F.2d at 850 n.4 (conflicts discussion "perhaps ...
academic!').
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court of the United States, in one of the very few cases
in which it had occasion to discuss products liability, announced, in erroneous sole reliance
on the nonconflicts case of MacPherson, the conflicts rule that "commonly" "a person
acting outside the state may be held responsible according to the law of the state for
injurious consequences within it." Young v. Masci, 289 U.S. 253, 259 (1933). In Mac-
Pherson the domestic supplier rather than the foreign manufacturer was the defendant.
12. Only rarely will courts refrain from referring to the "rule' and base their de-
cisions on a lex fori coinciding with all pertinent foreign laws. See, e.g., Dalehite v.
United States, 346 U.S. 15, 53 (1953) (dissenting opinion) ; Alexander v. Inland Steel
Co., 263 F.2d 314 (8th Cir. 1958); Hentschel v. Baby Bathinette Corp., 215 F.2d 102,
104-05 (2d Cir. 1954). For a list of cases in which conflicts problems might have been
present but were ignored, see Page, Conflict of Law Problems in Automobile Accidents,
1943 Wis. L. REv. 145, 168 n.72 (1943). In a series of articles I hope to show that courts
in all countries and at all times, except for the current period of conceptualist deviation,
have treated the lex fori as the primarily applicable law. See Ehrenzweig, The Lex Fori-
The Basic Rule in the Conflict of Laws (article to be published in the Michigan Law Ree-
view for March 1960) ; Ehrenzweig, Lex Fori: Exception or Rule?, 32 RocKy MT. L. Rv.
13 (1959). See also Currie, On the Displacement of the Law of the Forun, 58 COLUm. L,
REv. 964 (1958). A major exception to this thesis is the fez validitatlis in the conflicts of
law of contracts. See Ehrenzweig, The Statute of Frauds it the Conflict of Laws: The
Basic Rule of Validation, 59 COLu. L. RW. 874 (1959) ; Ehrenzweig, Contracts in the
Conflict of Laws-Part One: Validity, 59 CoLum. L. Ray. 973 (1959) ; Ehrenzweig, Con-
tractual Capacity of Married Women and Infants in the Conflict of Laws, 43 MINN. L. REV.
899 (1959); Ehrenzweig, Releases of Concurrent Tortfeasors in the Conflict of Laws
(article to be published in the Virginia Law Review for May 1960).
13. All through this Article I shall use the phrase "a proper law" as designating any
law having a contact with the case sufficient to displace the lex fori. See also Ehrenz-
weig, Contracts in the Conflict of Laws-Part One: Validity, 59 COLUM. L. RLv. 973
(1959). This usage is fundamentally different from that suggested by Professor Morris
according to whom "the proper law" is the law primarily applicable. Morris, The Proper
[ Vol. 69 :70,4
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The tortured constructions and doctrinary convulsions to which courts are
driven by their lipservice to the Restatement may be illustrated by two by-no-
means-isolated cases. In Rhode Island a manufacturer is liable to third parties
for his defective products within the scope of the now almost universally ac-
cepted MacPherson rule. But a Rhode Island suit by the Mississippi user of
a defective Rhode Island product was dismissed by the federal district court
"reluctantly" following the "harsh rule" of ississippi,24 which had refused to
accept the MacPherson doctrine. The court felt compelled to do so because
Mississippi was the "place of wrong." Historically at least, the primary, if not
exclusive, rationale of this reference is, to use a phrase of Justice Holmes, that
it is unjust for the forum to treat a defendant "according to its own notions
rather than those of the place where he did the acts."'1 It would have been
difficult in the present case for the defendant to assert that he had observed a
different standard of conduct or a different practice in pricing or insurance
as to sales in Mississippi. No wonder that in order to do justice in the face
of such hopelessly inadequate doctrine, judge Magruder reversed the district
court decision. But, adhering to the Restatement rule, he had to take refuge
in a reconstruction of Mississippi law in the plaintiff's favor.1 0
In another case, a Missouri plaintiff had been injured in an Indiana air
crash, presumably caused by a defect of the airplane which had been manu-
factured and inadequately repaired in Kansas. Neither the court nor the par-
ties were willing to investigate the clearly irrelevant law of Indiana and ac-
quiesced in the application of the law of Kansas, the lex fori. But in order to
do so, the court had to announce its own peculiar understanding of the Re-
statement's place-of-wrong rule as designating the place "where the airplane
was manufactured and repaired, rather than ... where the accident occurred."1
This, then, is the "certainty" of the Restatcnicnt rule to which courts have
been urged to sacrifice application of their own law.
Fortunately, among the thirty-odd cases purporting to apply the place-of-
Law of a Tort, 64 HA~v. L. REv. 881 (1951). For a comparative study of American Liews,
see De Nova, Rassegna della dottrina Anglo-Americana sii conflitti di leggi: 1940-1950,
2 Jus 251 (1950).
14. See Mason v. American Emery Wheel Works, 241 F2d 906, 903 (1st Cir.), ceri.
denied, 355 U.S. 815 (1957).
15. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909). See also
ALI, TREAaisE ACcoiIPANeYING RFsTATEaME T OF THE LAw or CoNrucr or LAws, Dmrr
No. 20-R, at 54 (1927), rejecting the English lex fori rule as "opposed to... an obvious
requirement of justice, that a person may rely upon the law of the place where he acts
or in which he causes events to happen... !' On Justice Holmes' private, more realistic,
approach to conflicts law, see EuRENzwEiG, CoNmicr or LAws 11 n18 (1959).
16. Mlason v. American Emery Wheel Works, 241 F.2d 906 (1st Cir.), cert. denicd,
355 U.S. 815 (1957). It is doubtful if the holding correctly represented Mississippi law.
See Rogers, Foreseeabiity it; the Law of Negligence, 29 Miss. UJ. 158 (1958) ; Com-
ment, 26 U. CRY. J_ REv. 653 n.5 (1959). On Rhode Island law, see S. C Johnson &
Son, Inc. v. Palmieri, 260 F.2d 88 (1st Cir. 1958); Pastorelli v. Associated Eng'rs, Inc.,
176 F. Supp. 159 (D.R.I. 1959).
17. Vrooman v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 183 F.2d 479, 480 (10th Cir. 1950).
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wrong rule, only two cases have been found in which application of a foreign
law actually affected the result. Both involved an Ohio penal statute which,
according to Ohio case law, has the effect of making the seller of defective
food products liable without proof of negligence. In the first case, decided by
the Second Circuit,' 8 an Ohio plaintiff recovered under the Ohio statute
against a New York distributor of contaminated beef, because plaintiff's de-
ceased "ate the food, took sick and died" in Ohio. The fact that defendant's
conduct took place in New York did "not oust the law of Ohio." In the sec-
ond case, a lower court in Missouri reached a similar result, following the
Second Circuit decision. 19
While there can be little quarrel with the result of these tvo cases, their
dogmatic reasoning could fatally confuse the nascent conflicts law of products
liability. To take two extreme situations: An Ohio citizen, on a trip to New
York, consumes, and falls ill from, contaminated food produced and sold by
an Ohio manufacturer in violation of the Ohio statute. Under the Restatement
"rule," apparently sanctioned by the courts in the two above mentioned cases,
he would not be able to recover under the Ohio statute because the harm
occurred in New York. Or an Italian citizen, on a trip through Ohio, consumes,
and falls ill from, contaminated food produced and sold to him in Italy. Under
the Restatement "rule" he could recover from the Italian manufacturer under
Ohio law in any state in which he could obtain jurisdiction. The basis for
distinguishing these situations from those properly subjected to the law of the
place of harm must be found in the rationale of products liability itself.
In a much-quoted concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.,"0
Justice Traynor would have based this liability partially on the fact that "the
risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the
public as a cost of doing business." 21 While this proposition probably does not
reflect present law in any jurisdiction, it admirably expresses what may well
18. Hunter v. Derby Foods, Inc., 110 F.2d 970 (2d Cir. 1940).
19. Hughes Provision Co. v. La Mear Poultry & Egg Co., 242 S.W.2d 285 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1.951) (Ohio retailer permitted to recover under Ohio statute from Missouri sup-
plier). Application of the lex for might have produced the same result. See 24 Mo. L.
REv. 554 (1959).
2 RABEL, CONFLICT OF LAWs 319 (1947), relying on HANCOCI, ToRTs IN TI CON-
FLICr OF LAws 254 (1942), also cites Reed & Barton Corp. v. Maas, 73 F.2d 359 (1st Cir.
1934), for the proposition that the locality to which the defendant's operations are directed
is the material one for conflicts purposes. But in that case the court expressly stressed
the identity of the pre-Erie federal law otherwise possibly applicable.
20. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.Zd 436 (1944). In Burgess v. Montgomery Ward & Co.,
264 F.2d 495 (10th Cir. 1959), lack of a modern rationale led to decision for defendant
distributor in a suit by a seriously injured user of a ladder which broke when first ex-
tended. The court reasoned that defendant was not "obliged to test this ladder for struc-
tural strength," any more than "the operator of every retail store in the villages which
dot the Kansas prairies." Id. at 498. That may be so. But, in contrast to the village re-
tailer and the consumer, a national chain store -is obligated and able to insure against
losses caused by its operations.
21. 24 Cal. 2d at 462, 150 P.2d at 441,
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become the prevailing rationale of products liability and thus properly usable
as the basis of conflicts law: the supplier's broadening liability to both his
buyer and third parties is both bearable and needed primarily because it serves
the distribution of objectively, and usually subjectively, unavoidable loss and
is, therefore, calculable in the process of pricing and insuring.2 2 For intrastate
purposes, the basis of such calculation is, of course, the supplier's own law.
Where, however, distribution in sister states as well as abroad is contemplated
or at least foreseeable, the possible impact of laws prevailing in the states or
countries of such distribution must and can be taken into accounLt. No reason
is apparent why in such cases the manufacturer should be given the benefit of
a more lenient law.
22. This position is widely held. See N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n, Products Liability
for Breach of Warranty and Negligence, N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 65, at 417 (1943) ; Enuuz-
wEIG, NEGLIGENcEWITHOUT FAuLT (1951); Ehrenzweig, Assurance Oblige-A Com-
parative Study, 15 LAw & CoTmimp. ProB. 445 (1950); Feezer, Manufacturcrs Liability
for Injuries Caused by His Products: Defective Autonwbiles, 37 Micn. L. REv. 1, 24
(1938); Green, Should the Manufacturer of General Products Be Liable Without Negli-
gence?, 24 TENN. L. REV. 928 (.1957); Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute
Liability, 37 VA. L. REv. 359, 384 (1951) ; James, General Products-Should Manufac-
turers Be Liable Without Negligence?, 24 TENN. L. Rxv. 923 (1957) ; James, Products
Liability, 34 TEXAs L. REv. 192 (1955); James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The
Impact of Liability Insurance, 57 YALE L.J. 549 (1948); Llewellyn, On Warranty of
Quality, and Society, 36 CoLum. L. R1v. 699, 704 n.14 (1936). But see Cooperrider, A
Comment on the Law of Torts, 56 Mica. L. REv. 1291, 1305 (1958); Plant, Strict Lia-
bility of Manufacturers for Injuries Caused by Defects in Products: An Opposing View,
24 TENN. L. REV. 938 (1957). For intermediate positions, see Lucey, Liability IVithout
Fault and the Natural Law, 24 TFNr. L. REv. 952 (1957) ; Noel, Manufacturers of Prod-
ucts-The Drift Toward Strict Liability, 24 TFNN. L. REv. 963 (1957) ; Wilson, Products
Liability, 43 CA i'. L. REv. 809 (1955). See generally Symposium: Advertiscd-Product
Liability, 8 Cr-v.- M_ L. REv. 1 (1959).
23. See Ehrenzweig, The Place of Acting in Intentional Multistate Torts: Law and
Reason Versus the Restatement, 36 Mixx. L REv. 1, 19 (1951) ; cf. Shuman & Prevezer,
Torts in English and American Conflict of Laws: The Role of the Forum, 56 Mica. L
Rxv. 1067, 1113 (1958).
Conceivably, an American manufacturer relying on the lenient liability laws of his
own state may seek to limit distribution of his product to that state. If such a scheme
were devised bona fide, as for example to make possible hazardous but socially desirable
experiments, and if sufficient precautions were taken to warn out-of-state users, there
could be situations in which application of a foreign law of liability would be inappro-
priate under the test here proposed. A similar situation could arise with regard to extra-
national products of a foreign manufacturer subjected to transient jurisdiction in this
country. But such situations would be rare. Since the foreign manufacturer can generally
be subject to the jurisdiction of a court in this country only if he is doing business here,
problem cases would be limited to those where he has expressly excluded distribution in
this country of a particular product. Current products liability insurance -policies are
usually limited to accidents within the United States, its territories and possessions and
Canada. Arnold, Products Liability Insurance, 1957 Wis. L. RL,. 429, 440. Here again
interstate and international conflicts may require different treatment. EumnvzwMo, Co:N-
FucT OF LAws 17-22 (1959). See also 2 RABE, Coxmcr oF LAws 319-20 (1947). For
a case in which the manufacturer sought to avoid the multiple impact of liability and lit-
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In general, plaintiff will be able to obtain application of the most favorable
law by choosing his forum in the expectation that the court will, in accordance
with the basic rule,24 apply its own law. This rule alone may ultimately suffice
once the judicial and legislative reform of our law of jurisdiction has, on the
one hand, put at the plaintiff's disposal all "convenient fora" including that of
his residence and, on the other hand, protected the defendant against being
"caught" in an inconvenient forum.25 But until the conclusion of this develop-
ment, the forum may have to choose relevant foreign laws over its own. For
the protection of the plaintiff, Walter Wheeler Cook in 1942 suggested that
the plaintiff be given the choice of the law most favorable to him.2" Limited
to foreseeable and thus "insurable" laws, this postulate is, in effect, operative
today, in keeping with the growing tendency of American courts to protect
the consumer. In all cases in which the conflicts question was pertinent, the
decision was for the plaintiff.27
gation by an agreement with the foreign distributor, see George Monro, Ltd. v. American
Cyanamid & Chem. Corp., [.1944] K.B. 432 (C.'A.).
Some support for the suggested test might be derived from the leading case of 1-hunter
v. Derby Foods, Inc., 110 F.2d 970, 972 (2d Cir. 1940), where the court stressed the fact
that defendant had "sent food into Ohio .... ." The -same factor appears in the peculiar
analogies referred to by the court: "that of shooting a firearm across the state line,...
or owning a vicious animal which strays over the line." Ibid. In all such cases the for-
eign impact is at least foreseeable.
24. See Ehrenzweig, The Lex Fori-The 'Basic Rule in the Conflict of Laws (article
to be published in the Michigan Law Review for March 1960).
25. See Ehrenzweig, The Transient Ride of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power"
Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289 (1956).
26. Coox, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF TilE CONFLICT OF LAWS 345 (1942):
"After all, the defendant did act for his own purposes, and his act caused the damage;
if the domestic rule of one of the states would impose liability if all had happened there,
why not allow the recovery ?" Cook did not see this postulate endangered by certain older
decisions of the United States Supreme Court which were based on obsolete "notions
about the necessary territorial limitations upon 'law.'" Id. at 40 n.75.
27. Cases in which the plaintiff lost, when analyzed, reveal either that no conflict was
present, or that the court was advised of no conflict, or viewed the conflicts question as
irrelevant. See Mannsz v. Macwhyte Co., 155 F.2d 445 (3d Cir. 1946) (recovery denied
under law of Pennsylvania, state of forum and harm; no law more favorable to plaintiff
mentioned) ; Brooks v. Hill-Shaw Co., 117 F2d 682, 685 (7th Cir. 1941) (conflict irrele-
vant) ; Page v. Cameron Iron Works, 155 F. Supp. 283, 288 (S.D. Tex. 1957) (conflict
irrelevant) (semble) ; Minrose Hat Co. v. Gabriel, 149 F. Supp. 908 (D.N.J. 1957) (law
of the place of manufacture and that of the forum (and harm) both denied applicability
of res ipsa loquitur in view of defendant's "explanation") ; Saena v. Zenith Optical Co.,
135 W. Va. 795, 65 S.E.2d 205 (1951) (no conflict). In Poplar v. Bourjois, Inc., 293
N.Y. 62, 80 N.E.2d 334 (1948), a negligence suit against a perfume manufacturer was
dismissed under the law of Maryland, the state of the plaintiff's place of injury. But the
narrow interpretation of the MacPherson. rule in New York, the forum and presumably
state of manufacture, would apparently have led to the same result. See PRossEa, TOUTS
500 & nn.31, 37 (2d ed. 1955). Cases barring the suit under the forum or foreign statute
of limitations are not pertinent. E.g., Maryland v. Eis Automotive Corp., 145 F. Supp.
444 (D. Conn. 1956); McGrath v. Helena Rubenstein, Inc., 29 F. Supp. 822 (S.D.N.Y.
1939). Nor are decisions concerning jurisdiction. E.g., Openbrier v. General Mills, Inc,,
340 Pa. 167, 16 A.2d 379 (1940).
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To be sure, this rule might occasionally enable the plaintiff to recover
against a foreign supplier under the latter's law where he would fail to recover
against a domestic defendant. But this concededly undesirable result merely
reflects the equally undesirable, but unavoidable, fact that any scheme for the
distribution of losses caused by nationwide mass distribution is, and will prob-
ably continue to be, based on the supplier's rather than on the consumer's
calculation. While the latter cannot be realistically expected to arrange his
program of insurance and consumption to accord with the liability laws of each
state whose products he may consume, the producer can be expected to cal-
culate his losses under the laws of each state in which his products may be
distributed, and thus to carry the burden of the most unfavorable law among
those reasonably foreseeable and insurable.
The defendant, under our present law of jurisdiction, must be permitted,
however, to object to the application of a'nonforeseeable and thus uninsurable
law in a "transient" forum. The most important limitation on the Ie.c fori in
this respect is one analogous to that discussed in my earlier Article on "Guest
Statutes in the Conflict of Laws.128 The guest boarding an automobile in the
state where it is permanently kept may eoxpect only as much protection as is
given to him by the law of that state, and if that law contains a so-called
guest statute limiting his host's liability to wilful negligence, this liability is all
the guest should be allowed to count on wherever he may be injured. It seems
unreasonable to compel the host, as we do now, to buy insurance against a
liability that he might incur under the law of a state possibly to be reached on
a yet unplanned out-of-state trip. On the other hand, the guest can be expected
to be familiar with the guest statute of his host's state and to carry his own
accident insurance without regard to more favorable laws prevailing in his
own state or in states he might touch on his trip. This situation is of course
absent in the typical products liability case. The average consumer cannot
realistically be expected to carry the accident or health insurance he needs
even under the products liability laws of his home state. On the other hand,
insurance for liabilities incurred under the consumer's law can reasonably be
carried by the manufacturer who expects distribution of his product in the
consumer's state.
This conclusion may be different where the buyer is an entrepreneur him-
self, as for instance, a builder or department chain store who purchases ma-
terials from manufacturers or wholesalers all over the country. Such a buyer
may himself be expected to foresee and calculate the incidents of his opera-
tions. 29 To be sure, in such cases the most appropriate allocation of the burden
to insure will often be doubtful, and, owing to our present highly uncertain
conflicts law, insurance practice lacks a reasonable pattern. But once the courts
28. 69 YAi. LJ. 595 (1960).
29. PRossEP, ToRTs 506 (2d ed. 1955), points out this difference, citing Note, 37
CoLtni. L. REv. 77 (1937). See also Plant, Strict Liability of Mautfacturers for Injuries
Caused by Defects in Products-An Opposing Vie'w, 24 TENN. L. REv. 938, 946 (1957);
EHREvzwmG, NEGLiGExcc WnouTr FAULT (1951).
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have imposed liabilities based on such an allocation, however arbitrary, insur-
ance practice will follow.80 Wihether the manufacturer or another supplier be
held liable, whether the forum adhere to a fault concept of products liability
or to a limitation of this liability to the immediate purchaser, and whether it
favor the wider distribution of risks and losses in any or all respects, any
court should accept the application of proper laws typically calculable in the
particular enterprise. In this sense enterprise liability will, in the conflicts con-
text, also, "extend to all casualties and hazards that are injected into society
by the activity of the enterprise, at least to the extent that they are reasonably
foreseeable." 3'
In the absence of conclusive rulings on the subject, it seems permissible,
and indeed imperative, to formulate postulates which can now be adopted by
the courts without abandonment of accepted terminology, and which respond
to economic and social needs as well as to sound theory.8 2 In summarizing
these postulates, a distinction must be drawn according to whether the parties
in the particular case have the benefit of a modern law of jurisdiction or must
adjust their needs to the catch-as-catch-can (transient) rule still prevailing to
some extent in some states, under which the forum may well lack the desirable
contact-based competency. 33
First, the le.r fori applies prima facie, in accordance with the basic rule of
tort conflicts law and the practical exigencies of products liability in particu-
lar.
Second, the modern law of personal jurisdiction now permits in some states,
and will no doubt soon permit more generally, suit in virtually any state that
has at least one of a growing number of contacts with the case. Among those,
30. Such liabilities, with their multiple impact on manufacturers, wholesalers and re-
tailers, are, however, hardly suited to offer final solutions. Ultimately, these concurrent
liabilities and liability conflicts as well as liability insurance will have to yield to a scheme
insuring losses where they occur. See generally EHRENZWEIG, "FULL AID" INSURANlCE
FOR THE TRAFIC VICTIM (1954) (with domestic and foreign models) ; GREEN, TaFFIC
VIcTIMs, TORTS LAW AND INSURANCE (1958); Feldman, Liability of Manufacturers of
Home Furnishings for Harin. Done by the Product, 1955 INS. L.J. 519; Ehrenzwelg,
Book Review, 11 STAN. L. Rnv. 400 (1959).
31. James, General Products-Should Manufacturers Be Liable Without Neglience,
24 TENN. L. Rav. 923, 927 (1957).
32. Owing to the ubiquity of possible harm caused by the production of atomic energy,
adoption of conflicts rules based on similar principles seems imperative although limita-
tion of maximum recoveries, preferably by a scheme of loss insurance, will be inevitable.
See, e.g., Boisser&e, Fragen des interlokalen und internationalen Privatrechis bei der
Haftung ffir Schiden durch Atomanlagen, 11 NEuE JuRisTiscHE Wocuuscuin r 849
(1958). See also Seavey, Torts and Ators, 46 CALIF. L. Rav. 3, 11 (1958), suggesting
federal legislation as the only remedy. See generally Ehrenzweig, The Altom and the Laic
of Torts, A Beginning and at; End, in VOLUME IN HONOR OF PROFESSOR WAoATSUMA 16
(1958); Murphy, Atomic Energy and the Law: A Bibliography, 12 VAND. L. REv. 229
(1958) ; ATomic INDUSTRIAL FORUM, INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS OF FINANCING PROrrCTION
AGAINST NucLEAR RISK (1959).
33. See generally EHRENzWEIG, CONFLIcT OF LAWS 102-06, 120-25 (1959).
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in addition to the defendant's domicile, the "place of wrong" will usually be
included. It is likely that further progress will lead to the treatment of plain-
tiffs residence as the place of wrong for the purpose of creating a proper forum.3
Under this system, the plaintiff would usually be able to choose from among
several courts that with the most favorable law. Whether the parties' unequal
economic status in the typical products liability case will induce the courts to
relieve the plaintiff of the burden of a foreign law suit by permitting him to
claim a more favorable foreign law even at the place of his own residence
remains to be seen.
In any event, in those cases in which defendant, owing to peculiar con-
ditions of his business,35 will feel justly aggrieved at having his liability treated
under a noninsurable lex fon the doctrine of forum non conveniens will have
to supply the necessary corrective. 36 Once the state of the plaintiff's residence
has become more widely available to the latter, the defendant will probably
more generally be permitted to resort to this doctrine to prevent suit in a then
largely unnecessary transient forum. In the federal courts transfer of such
cases to the more convenient forum should not be permitted to preclude ap-
plication of the more proper lex fori of the transferee court.3 7
Finally, choice of law will remain generally necessary in those states in
which, in the absence of a machinery assuring a contact-based jurisdiction, the
plaintiff or the defendant may still be forced into an improper forum and thus
subjected to an "improper" lex for. In such cases the plaintiff must be per-
mitted to claim applicability of any "proper" law-usually that of the defend-
ant's place of business or of the plaintiff's residence. The defendant, on the
other hand, must be permitted to object to the application of any lex Jori
which is not reasonably foreseeable and insurable.38
34. Compare Shuman & Prevezer, uipra note 23, at 1.107, suggesting that the place
of harm in certain unique situations should be "where the plaintiff is unable to support
his family or to continue his work... or may become a public responsibility ... 
35. See note 23 supra.
36. Considerations of this kind may have induced the English court in George Monro,
Ltd. v. American Cyanamid & Chem. Corp., [1944] K.B. 432 (CA.), to decline juris-
diction in a subrogation suit by an English distributor against an American manufacturer
who, "with the consent of the plaintiffs, [had sought carefully] to keep all claims against
them within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of the United States." Id. at 43S.
37. See Currie, Change of Venue and the Conflict of Loa's, 22 U. CuL L Rv. 405,
459-70 (1955).
38. The law of a transient forum as such is probably not a foreseeable law in this
sense. Thus a supplier operating in a state with a lenient liability law should probably be
entitled to rely in his calculations on the incidence of losses occurring in states with
similar lenient laws notwithstanding the possibility that plaintiffs from these states might
sue in third states by obtaining transient jurisdiction.
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